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Democracy and Stock Market Performance in Developing Countries 
Abstract
This is paper is a natural extension of Yang (2011) where-in democracy is not positively 
related to stock market development. We postulate that when moment conditions of stock market 
performance are accounted for, democracy improves financial markets in developing countries. 
Channels  of  democracy,  polity  and autocracy  are  instrumented  with  legal-origins,  religious-
legacies, income-levels and press-freedom qualities. As a policy implication democracies have 
important effects on both the degree of competition for public office and the quality of public 
policies that favor stock market performance in developing countries.
JEL Classification: G10 ; G18; G28; P16;  P43
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1.  Motivation
This  paper  complements  Yang  (2011)  with  four  dimensions.  Firstly,  it  introduces 
essential  moment  conditions  of  stock  market  development  (legal-origins,  religious-legacies, 
income-levels  and  press-freedoms)  into  the  analysis;  where-in  the  impact  of  democracy 
(autocracy) on financial market performance is conditional on the validity of the instruments. 
Secondly, it adds indicators of stock market activity, efficiency and size to the measure of depth 
used  by  Yang  (2011).  Thirdly,  the  paper  introduces  a  measure  of  autocracy  to  assess  the 
consistency of democracy indicators. Fourthly, for further robustness purposes the dimensions of 
democracy and stock market indicators are reduced with principal component analysis.  
2. Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
Detailed  description  of  data  sources,  variables,  summary  statistics  and  correlation 
analysis are presented in the appendices.  
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Endogeneity
While democracy might account for stock market performance, a reverse causality cannot 
be ruled-out especially as market-pressures do influence the quality of political  systems. The 
potential  correlation  between  endogenous  independent  variables  with  errors-terms  in  the 
equation of interest is taken into account by an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique. 
Previous  research  has  demonstrated  the  correlation  of  financial  development  with  selected 
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instruments outlined in the appendices (La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Beck et 
al., 2003; Asongu, 2011ab)
2.2.2 Estimation Technique
Contrary to Yang (2011) who combines the regression in differences with the regression 
in levels, we adopt the IV process as follows.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigihannelPoliticalC )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                                                  (1) 
Second-stage regression:
++= itit DemocracyFinance )(10 γγ +itAutocracy)(2γ +itiXβ   µ                                      (2) 
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS  over  an  OLS  estimation  technique  via  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-show that the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables 
(political-regime channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-verify if  the instruments are valid  and not correlated with the error-term in the equation of 
interest through an Over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
This section assesses the strength and the validity of the instruments. Put in plainer terms, 
it investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of the instruments to explain political-regimes 
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conditional on government-quality covariates; and (2) the capacity of political-regimes to explain 
stock market performance dynamics contingent on the instruments. 
3.1 Democracy and Instruments
Table 1 below depicts the first condition for the IV procedure where-in, the instruments 
must be exogenous to the endogenous components of political-regime channels conditional on 
government-quality control variables. Findings reveal, distinguishing African countries by legal-
origins,  religious-dominations,  income-levels  and  press-freedom quality  helps  explain  cross-
country differences in the quality of political regimes. Thus the instruments are strong as they 
enter jointly significantly at the 1% significance level. 
Table 1: Political-regime channels and instruments (First-Stage regressions)
Democracy Polity Autocracy  
Constant 0.948 6.374*** 21.016*** 0.359 -20.311*** 6.374***
(0.456) (5.970) (8.080) (0.345) (-8.830) (5.970)
Legal-
origins
English  common-law 4.193*** --- -8.805*** --- 13.004*** ---
(4.417) (-7.411) (12.38)
French civil-law --- -12.597*** --- 7.594*** --- -12.597***
(-12.37) (7.641) (-12.37)
Religions
Christianity -1.062 --- -9.909*** --- 9.035*** ---
(-0.900) (-6.706) (6.914)
Islam --- -8.171*** --- 7.211*** --- -8.171***
(-7.089) (6.408) (-7.089)
Income 
Levels
Low Income --- -5.537*** --- 6.152*** --- -5.537***
(-6.041) (6.874) (-6.041)
Middle Income -0.479 --- -0.257 --- -0.236 ---
(-0.657) (-0.282) (-0.293)
Lower Middle  Income -2.935*** --- -10.057*** --- 7.175*** ---
(-2.868) (-7.848) (6.332)
Upper Middle Income --- -5.106*** --- 4.078*** --- -5.106***
(-3.781) (3.093) (-3.781)
Press 
Freedoms
Free 4.113*** --- 5.375*** --- -1.193 ---
(5.032) (5.253) (-1.318)
Partly Free 2.818*** --- 3.695*** --- -0.780 ---
(3.870) (4.055) (-0.969)
No Freedom --- 0.108 --- -1.845** --- 0.1086
(0.131) (-2.286) (0.131)
Control 
Variables
Regulation  Quality  1.601*** --- 2.384*** --- -0.804* ---
(3.721) (4.425) (-1.688)
Voice and Accountability --- -1.914*** --- 5.716*** --- -1.914***
(-2.867) (8.767) (-2.867)
Adjusted R² 0.796 0.637 0.808 0.864 0.617 0.637
Fisher test 61.842*** 32.957*** 66.576**** 116.951*** 26.107*** 32.957***
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. 
5
3.2 Financial Market and Democracy 
In the second-stage regressions we first justify our choice of the IV estimation technique 
with the Hausman test for endogeneity. The first four models of Table 2 are estimated by OLS 
because their estimates are efficient and consistent; as the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is 
not rejected. In the stock-market turnover (index) regressions we find that the instruments are 
both strong and valid through the Cragg-Donald Statistics (for Weak Instrument test) and OIR 
test  respectively.   Therefore  the  instruments  do  not  help  democracy  explain  stock-market 
performance beyond political-regime mechanisms. Overall,  we find evidence that contrary to 
Mulligan et al.(2004), democracies have important effects on both the degree of competition for 
public  office  and  the  quality  of  public  policies  that  favor  stock  market  development  in 
developing countries. 
Table 2: Second-Stage regressions
Stock Market(SM) Performance Robustness
SM Capitalization SM Value Traded SM Turnover Listed Companies SM Index
Constant 0.312*** 0.294*** 0.045* 0.041 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.022* 0.023* -0.277*
(6.594) (6.103) (1.825) (1.610) (3.192) (3.242) (1.876) (1.939) (-1.655)
Democracy 0.0308*** --- 0.013*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.012*** --- ---
(4.169) (3.547) (3.991) (6.722)
Polity 2(Revised) --- 0.034*** --- 0.014*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.012*** ---
(4.518) (3.604) (3.982) (6.702)
Democracy Index --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.580***
(4.722)
Autocracy -0.019** 0.016 -0.003 0.011 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.010*** -0.001
(-2.333) (1.302) (-0.866) (1.638) (-1.352) (0.987) (-0.842) (2.803) (-0.021)
Hausman-test 4.190 4.240 2.496 2.524 7.473** 7.552** 6.545** 6.721** 5.593*
OIR-Sargan --- --- --- --- 2.196 2.249 32.909*** 32.93*** 6.467
P-value [0.699] [0.690] [0.000] [0.000] [0.166]
Cragg-Donald --- --- --- --- 21.144*** 20.992*** 23.167*** 22.982*** 20.605***
Adjusted R² 0.098 0.108 0.053 0.054 0.085 0.084 0.241 0.087 0.134
Fisher Statistics 15.163*** 16.750*** 7.846*** 8.052*** 11.516*** 11.478*** 27.529*** 27.380*** 15.096***
Observations 259 259 245 245 158 158 163 163 154
Initial Instruments Constant; Lower-Middle-Income; Middle-Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press
Robust Instruments Constant; Upper-Middle-Income; Low-Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press
OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test for First-Stage regressions. Critical values for TSLS bias relative to OLS for  
Cragg-Donald Statistics are 15.72 and 9.48 for 5% and 10% respectively. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.
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5. Conclusion
 We conclude that when moment conditions of stock market performance are accounted 
for,  democracy improves  financial  markets  in  developing countries.  Channels  of democracy, 
polity and autocracy are instrumented with legal-origins, religious-legacies, income-levels and 
press-freedom qualities.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (1990 to 2010)
Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser.
Stock 
Market 
Performance
Stock Market  Capitalization 0.354 0.521 0.008 3.382 259
Stock Market  Value Traded  0.078 0.268 0.000 2.591 245
Stock Market Turnover 0.095 0.119 0.000 0.704 253
Number of Listed Companies 0.067 0.085 0.002 0.712 268
Democracy Democracy Index 3.170 4.315 -8.000 10.000 294
Polity Index(Revised) 0.653 6.499 -10.000 10.000 294
Autocracy Autocracy Index 2.544 3.837 -8.000 10.000 294
Control 
Variables 
Regulation  Quality  -0.224 0.694 -2.394 0.905 168
Voice and Accountability -0.389 0.793 -1.805 1.047 168
Legal 
Origin
English Common-Law 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
French Civil-Law 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Religion Christianity 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Islam 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Income 
Levels
Low Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Middle Income 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Lower Middle Income 0.428 0.495 0.000 1.000 294
Upper Middle Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Freedom of 
the Press
Press Freedom 0.345 0.476 0.000 1.000 165
Partial Press Freedom 0.230 0.422 0.000 1.000 165
No Press Freedom 0.424 0.495 0.000 1.000 165
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations 
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            Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis    
Stock  Market   Performance Political-regimes Control Vbles Instrumental  Variables
SMC SMVT SMT ListC Demo Poli Auto R.Q V&A Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree
1.000 0.863 0.733 0.242 0.294 0.331 -0.21 0.220 0.310 0.109 -0.10 0.123 -0.12 -0.14 0.144 -0.23 0.399 0.391 -0.12 -0.27 SMC
1.000 0.795 0.084 0.240 0.228 -0.10 0.218 0.257 0.074 -0.07 0.065 -0.06 -0.13 0.130 -0.13 0.274 0.337 -0.13 -0.21 SMV
1.000 0.078 0.118 0.056 0.039 0.128 0.096 -0.18 0.180 -0.24 0.242 -0.17 0.176 0.048 0.117 0.340 -0.06 -0.27 SMT
1.000 0.442 0.405 -0.16 0.334 0.458 0.146 -0.14 0.156 -0.15 -0.30 0.308 -0.26 0.596 0.557 -0.18 -0.37 ListC
1.000 0.805 -0.25 0.526 0.840 0.535 -0.53 0.353 -0.35 0.031 -0.03 -0.63 0.667 0.679 0.051 -0.69 Demo
1.000 -0.77 0.429 0.836 0.496 -0.49 0.437 -0.43 0.032 -0.03 -0.68 0.718 0.667 0.060 -069 Poli
1.000 -0.08 -0.39 -0.23 0.232 -0.33 0.336 -0.03 0.032 0.434 -0.44 -0.30 -0.03 0.324 Auto
1.000 0.725 0.013 -0.01 0.066 -0.06 -0.39 0.399 -0.20 0.627 0.618 -0.02 -0.58 R.Q
1.000 0.471 -0.47 0.397 -0.39 -0.07 0.079 -0.67 0.821 0.805 -0.00 -0.78 V&A
1.000 -1.00 0.650 -0.65 0.400 -0.40 -0.73 0.400 0.229 0.173 -0.36 Eng.
1.000 -0.65 0.650 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 -0.17 0.368 Frch.
1.000 -1.00 0.400 -0.40 -0.73 0.400 0.229 -0.37 0.100 Chris
1.000 -4.00 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 0.377 -0.10 Islam
1.000 -1.00 -0.54 -0.40 -0.36 0.095 0.268 LI
1.000 0.547 0.400 0.363 -0.09 -0.26 MI
1.000 -0.54 -0.44 0.020 0.410 LMI
1.000 0.775 -0.11 -0.64 UMI
1.000 -0.39 -0.62 Free
1.000 -0.46 PFree
1.000 NFree
SMC: Stock Market Capitalization. SMVT: Stock Market Value Traded. SMT: Stock Market Turnover. ListC: Listed Companies. Demo: Democracy. Poli: Polity. Auto: Autocracy. R.Q: Regulation  
Quality. V&A: Voice and Accountability. Eng: English Common-Law. Frch. French Civil-Law. Chris: Christianity. LI: Low Income Countries. MI: Middle-Income-Countries. LMI: Lower-Middle-
Income Countries. UMI: Upper-Middle-Income Countries. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Sign Variable Definitions Sources
Stock Market Capitalization SMC Stock Market Capitalization(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Stock Market Value Traded SMVT Stock Market Total Value Traded(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Stock Market Turnover SMT Stock Market Turnover Ratio World Bank(FDSD)
Listed Companies ListC Number of Listed Companies Per(% of Population) World Bank(FDSD)
Democracy Demo Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Polity Pol Revised Combined  Polity Score World Bank(WDI)
Autocracy Auto Institutionalized Autocracy World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality World Bank(WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability World Bank(WDI)
Press Freedom Free Freedom House Index Freedom House
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.
Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num
Law
English Common-Law Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
French Civil-Law Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 4
Religion 
Christianity Botswana, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
Islam Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia. 4
Income 
Levels
Low-Income Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 4
Middle-Income Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
10
Lower-Middle-Income Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tunisia. 
8
Upper-Middle-Income  Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa. 4
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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